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Abstract 
This research experiment investigated whether the nuclear taboo was more influential on 
participants when considering the use of nuclear weapons, or if the participants were influenced 
more by cost benefit analysis when deciding to use nuclear weapons. In this study, we presented 
a fake military scenario to respondents with a total of eight different versions that either did or 
did not include: genocide, high casualties, and nuclear weapons. Participants could then select 
whether they agreed, disagreed, or needed more information as there answer. Breaking 
respondents down into these three groups, the results show that for all three respondent groups 
the independent variable with the strongest effect was nuclear weapons. The weakest variable 
was high casualty rates, while genocide had the second strongest effect on the respondent’s 
decision-making process. These findings indicate that respondents were affected by the nuclear 
taboo and were less likely to conduct cost-benefit analysis when giving their answer to the 
military proposal.  
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most powerful devices ever created by mankind are nuclear weapons. Used 
only once in combat, they have not been used since World War Two. Many have tried to explain 
the precedent of non-use, and one school of thought is the nuclear taboo. The purpose of this 
thesis is to determine if social norms shape public attitudes regarding the use of nuclear weapons 
based on Nuclear Taboo Theory. A norm is defined by Tannenwald (1999) as, “a shared 
expectation about behavior, a standard of right or wrong.” (pg. 436). This mutual expectation 
exists between sovereign states who are also members of the international community. 
According to Tannenwald, the nuclear taboo forbids the use of nuclear weapons, and focuses not 
on the behavior itself, but the belief about the behavior (1999, 436). Each state’s influence over 
their populations helps establish such normative beliefs among each state’s citizens creating a 
consensus internationally about the behavior. 
However, Press, Sagan, and Valentino found that the nuclear taboo is weak among 
Americans, and that it does not take much for Americans to approve of the use of nuclear 
weapons (2013, 202). These findings seriously undercut the claims of Tannenwald and others 
that a nuclear taboo is effective in preventing the use of nuclear weapons. According to Press, 
Sagan, and Valentino, only a small group of subjects who rejected the use of nuclear weapons 
based their response about using nuclear weapons as immoral (2013, 202). These findings 
indicate the nuclear taboo is weak, and that there might be other explanations for why nuclear 
weapons have not been used during conflicts. However, there are problems with Press, Sagan, 
and Valentino’s (2013) research design. This thesis will use a more appropriate experimental 
framework to test if the nuclear taboo shapes public opinion on the use of nuclear weapons. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Previous literature regarding the nuclear taboo argues that the public sees the use of 
nuclear weapons as morally wrong. The nuclear taboo is a concept that is derived from an 
international relations theory known as constructivism. According to Checkel, constructivism has 
two assumptions, first the environment where states interact takes place is social and material, 
second this setting offers states an understanding of their interests by constituting to them (1998, 
325). These two assumptions allow for the environment of the international system to dictate 
actions and assumptions that states make towards others, which provide states with an identity 
that tells others what their interests are. These interests provide the foundation for social norms 
to be created that cause states to behave a certain way or share similar beliefs, such as the nuclear 
taboo. Yu-tai Tsai (2009) states, “Constructivism emphasizes the sociological concepts of ideas, 
norms, identity and culture.” (22). These social concepts help create and change the way states 
interact in the international system.  
According to Tannenwald, the United States in from using nuclear weapons during the 
Korean War, because their allies viewed nuclear weapons as immoral (1999, 445). This response 
from other states in the international system gave a consensus that nuclear weapons were indeed 
not appropriate to use. Tannenwald (2007) stated, “A powerful taboo against the use of nuclear 
weapons has developed in the global system” (2). This indicates that this belief is a part of the 
international social order and is binding to all member.  Also, Tannenwald says the taboo helps 
define weapons into categories such as acceptable or unacceptable and has become a set of 
practices among states defining what it means to be civilized (1999, 437). This allows for nuclear 
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weapons to be labeled by states with a clear rule as to what actions have limits to them and that 
these limits are established through normative beliefs about the use of nuclear weapons.  
According to Tannenwald, a taboo is a normative prohibition that is focused on 
protecting individuals and societies from conducting behavior that could be harmful to others 
and themselves (2005, 8). The nuclear taboo represents an intervention among states in the 
international system that all states must avoid this type of behavior due to the risks associated 
with nuclear weapons, which could have apocalyptic ramifications. Quester says, a taboo is 
something that we simply reject, and are not willing even consider doing (2005, 79).  It is this 
outcome that forces states to not only comply with the taboo but see it as a necessary action to 
prevent any state from breaking the taboo. Additionally, Tannenwald claims evidence of a 
nuclear taboo can be seen by the way people think and talk about nuclear weapons, and actions 
taken by leaders of states as well as international organizations (2005, 9). The nuclear taboo does 
exist because state actors associate a certain type of destruction with the use of nuclear weapons 
that is severe. This interpretation is proof that a taboo has developed when it comes to the use of 
nuclear weapons and how nuclear missiles differ from conventional types of weapons. 
According to Paul proof of the existence of a nuclear taboo can be seen by the fact that 
there exists no legal ban on the use of nuclear weapons, and nuclear states have refrained from 
using them against nonnuclear states, even when it made sense to use them (1995, 699). This 
proves that states, who are sovereign members of the international system do see the use of 
nuclear weapons as wrong and will not consent to using nuclear weapons even if it increases 
their odds of winning a war. Also, this demonstrates that even though the use of nuclear weapons 
may be beneficial to a state in the short term, it would have long term effects that would cause 
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damage to the international system. This damage would destroy all the states in the system, 
including any state who used nuclear weapons. The outcome of non-use by nuclear states, is a 
result of the nuclear taboo, and the taboo’s perception about nuclear weapons forces states to 
avoid being associated with nuclear usage.  
Also, Paul stated that, the nuclear taboo developed due to the amount of destruction 
associated with nuclear weapons, giving them a unique distinction from other types of weapons 
(1995, 702). The destruction that is so closely related to the use nuclear weapons would provide 
another reason why states would not want to use nuclear weapons. It will allow for massive 
amounts of devastation in such a short period of time, which states would mostly likely never be 
able to recover if nuclear weapons were used regularly in combat. Due to the type of destruction 
caused by nuclear weapons, it would cost states a lot of money and time to rebuild parts of their 
country, especially if a large portion of their population was killed. These consequences would 
make many states want to avoid massive loss of their population or infrastructure because the 
effects would be immediate, rather than expanding gradually.  
Gizewski claims that, the nuclear taboo is a significant obstacle causing restraint to the 
use of nuclear weapons (1996, 398). This shows that the taboo has law type of effect that forces 
states to view the use of nuclear weapons an illegal action. According to Paul (2010), “A taboo 
has an absoluteness to it whereby individual leaders would not consider the use of nuclear 
weapons as a rational option under any circumstances” (854). This establishes that the nuclear 
taboo has a significant effect on individual leaders, causing them to see the taboo as type of norm 
that should be preserved. Frey stated, norms are the rules about behavior, based upon an identity 
(2006, 5). Those who follow the taboo share a common identity that sees the use of nuclear 
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weapons as mutual destructive. It is this commonality that helps fuel the nuclear taboo and has 
provided the results of non-use for the past 70 years.   
In Press, Sagan, and Valentino’s experiment they discuss two distinct concepts that help 
describe the logic of actions, they are logic of consequence and logic of appropriateness. 
According to Schulz, logic of consequence and logic of appropriateness are helpful in classifying 
the actions of imperfectly rational actors and can be beneficial in understanding their behavior. 
(2014, 2). These two logics were used to examine survey respondents in Press, Sagan, and 
Valentino’s research experiment to see if people would approve of the use of nuclear weapons. 
Schultz (2014) states that, “Actors driven by logic of consequence engage in some form of 
imperfect analysis to evaluate future consequences of their decisions” (2). The weighing of 
possible outcomes to situations helps actors assess what actions are the best or cost effective. 
Kopelman, Messick, and Weber finds that appropriateness is distinct because of its emphasis on 
rules as driving decision making processes. (2004, 283).  
According to March and Olsen (2011), “The logic of appropriateness is a perspective on 
how human action is to be interpreted.” (pg. 478). March and Olsen define the logic of 
appropriateness as human actions that are driven by rules about certain behavior, that actors seek 
to fulfill these obligations embedded through social collectivity (2011, 478). The nuclear taboo is 
seen as the responsible interpretation to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by all members in 
the international community because the taboo is directed by the interests of each state’s 
institutions. Kopelman, Messick, and Weber (2004) state, “Rules simplify behavioral choices by 
narrowing options” (283). States with nuclear weapons know that if they use them, they will be 
violating their own institutions norms. These repercussions help keep states from not only using 
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nuclear weapons but limit the appeal to acquire them because they are unusable.  Additionally, 
March and Olsen describe the process of rule following as, a cognitive process that involves 
reasoning; but is not connected to future consequences, rather acting appropriately according to 
collective practices, based on mutual understandings of what is true, reasonable, right, and good. 
(2011, 479.) 
However, some recent research on the topic of the nuclear taboo puts the assumption that 
the public sees the use of nuclear weapons as morally wrong in doubt. According to Press, 
Sagan, and Valentino, public opinion surveys have been used to try and measure the public 
perception regarding nuclear weapons; however, these surveys are often yes or no questions, and 
do not look at the reasons behind their response (2013, 194). These surveys fail to capture why 
nuclear weapons are perceived to be right or wrong due to the lack of an explanation for the 
public’s negative response towards the use of nuclear weapons. Press, Sagan, and Valentino also 
stated that public opinion polls about nuclear weapons are infrequently and inconsistently 
worded. (2013, 194). Thus, they question many studies that suggest a nuclear taboo is the reason 
why nuclear weapons have not been used. 
According to Press, Sagan, and Valentino, scholars that studied nuclear norms focused on 
the beliefs and attitudes of political and military leaders who made statements during past 
military crisis involving the decision to use or not use nuclear weapons. (2013, 193). Focusing on 
these elite’s statements helped give context to why leaders decided not to use nuclear weapons 
and established the existence of a taboo among elites. However, Press, Sagan, and Valentino 
argue that studying elite statements has limitations such as actions or views expressed could have 
more than one explanation, as well many statements made have been in the public, which could 
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have a self-serving bias, and limits the study of nuclear attitudes to historical cases only. (2013, 
193). These critics put assumptions about the existence of a nuclear taboo in doubt and forces the 
need for more analysis and research to be conducted on the topic, to determine how strong the 
taboo is on the public’s perception on the use of nuclear weapons.  
The results of Press, Sagan, and Valentino’s experiment show that social norms are not 
the reason why the public is against the use of nuclear weapons, rather that the costs outweigh 
the benefits of using them (2013, 202). This argument is derived from the logic of consequence, 
which Schultz defines as actions that are driven by an individual’s assessment of all the possible 
outcomes and choosing the one that is seen as most beneficial (2014, 1). This argument 
challenges the nuclear taboo by arguing that the public would consider the use of nuclear 
weapons if the benefits outweighed the cost. Thus, the public perception about the use of nuclear 
weapons is not inherently based in the idea that nuclear weapons are unjustifiable, but the public 
can in fact justify their use depending upon desperation. As Press, Sagan, and Valentino (2013) 
stated, “People do not dabble in cannibalism when they are a little hungry; rather they resist until 
they are on the verge of starvation, and then only might they break the taboo.” (202). This 
experiment has challenged the idea that cost benefit analysis trumps the nuclear taboo in 
determining the public’s perception on nuclear weapons usage.   
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 
In this experiment, there are three independent variables that are being measured to assess 
whether respondents are choosing their answer based off logic of consequence or logic of 
appropriateness. Respondents will be given three options to choose for their answer, they can 
choose to agree, disagree, or need more information. The first variable is the type of airstrike that 
is being carried out (nuclear or conventional), the second is the number of casualties caused by 
the airstrike (ranging from 5,000 to 50,000), and the third is presence of another social norm 
(genocide). Each independent variable will be given a hypothesis, and there will be an additional 
three hypotheses for respondents who selected need more information as their answer.  
 The independent variable high casualty rate will cause respondents to conduct cost 
benefit analysis because the respondents will want to minimize the amount of lives lost in the 
planned military operation. Additionally, if casualty rates are high, this will cause respondents to 
be less supportive because they view the amount lives lost as costly. Also, if the operation results 
in high casualty rates, respondents would view the military action as unnecessary, preferring to 
seek an alternative military operation that would result in fewer casualties and would be more 
likely to disagree with the planned military action. Respondents could also see high casualty 
rates as potentially risky, considering that the military operation may kill a lot of innocent 
people. Support for this hypothesis would falsify the nuclear taboo because respondents are 
making their decision based off the expected casualty outcomes of the planned military action, 
not the type of weapons being used.  
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 Hypothesis 1: Scenarios with higher casualty rates, will make respondents more likely to 
disagree with the planned military action. 
The independent variable low casualty rates will cause respondents to conduct cost 
benefit analysis because the respondents will prefer to conduct military operations that have low 
casualty outcomes. Seeing the outcomes of the military operation as more important, rather than 
adhering to certain rules about military tactics. If casualties are low, the military operation will 
appear more reasonable to the respondent because the number of casualties is low and do not 
carry a heavy cost. With lower casualty rates respondents would agree with the planned military 
action because there is a lesser possibility of innocent people dying because of the planned 
military action. Support for this hypothesis would falsify the nuclear taboo because respondents 
are making their decision based off the expected casualty outcomes of the planned military 
action, not the type of weapons being used.  
Hypothesis 2: Scenarios with lower casualty rates, will make respondents more likely to agree 
with the planned military action.  
 The independent variable conventional airstrike will cause respondents to use logic of 
appropriateness to come up with their answer because conventional weapons are seen as an 
ethical military tactical response. Respondents will see the use of conventional weapons as a 
normal practice of military strategy and will view the action as ordinary or routine. This will 
cause the respondents to agree with the planned military action regardless of casualties because 
the military action being taken is considered a routine type of operation. Also, respondents may 
view casualties as a unpreventable outcome of military conflict. Additionally, respondents will 
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view the use of conventional weapons as a responsible reaction and does not violate any rules. 
Conventional airstrikes also could appear to be more effective because they minimize the amount 
of U.S involvement in foreign conflicts. Support for the hypothesis would confirm that a nuclear 
taboo is supported because the type of weapons being used is influencing the respondents 
answer. 
 Hypothesis 3: Scenarios with conventional airstrikes present, will make respondents more 
likely to agree with the planned military action.  
 The independent variable nuclear airstrike will cause respondents to use logic of 
appropriateness to reach their answer because nuclear weapons are an unethical military tactic. 
Respondents will view the use of nuclear weapons as an extreme type of evil in terms of military 
capabilities. Respondents will not support the use of nuclear weapons because they see them as 
morally wrong to use in military operations, because they cause massive amounts of casualties 
and damage in a matter of seconds. Additionally, respondents would see using nuclear weapons 
as a potential opportunity for U.S adversaries to retaliate or could signal to other states that 
nuclear weapons are okay to use. As well respondents would see the use of nuclear weapons as 
potentially damaging to U.S reputation.  Also, respondents would consider the use of nuclear 
weapons as an uncivilized type of military action, that is goes against American values. Support 
for the hypothesis would confirm that a nuclear taboo is supported because the type of weapons 
being used is influencing the respondents answer. 
Hypothesis 4: Scenarios with nuclear airstrikes present, will make respondents more likely to 
disagree with the planned military action.  
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 The independent variable genocide will cause respondents to use logic of appropriateness 
to reach their answer because genocide is seen as repulsive action that is condemned by the 
international community. Respondent’s will view the presence of genocide as an evil act that 
must be stopped, and that all tactics are on the table when considering the prevention genocide. 
Genocide will have the strongest effect on the respondents because of the historical implications 
that this type of behavior has had in the past. Causing many respondents to view the act of 
genocide as worse than the use of nuclear weapons or conducting a military operation that results 
in high casualties. Although respondents may not want to use nuclear weapons or accept high 
casualties, they will if that means preventing a genocide. Support for the hypothesis would 
falsify the nuclear taboo because genocide is seen as a greater evil and must be prevented by any 
means necessary. 
Hypothesis 5: Scenarios with genocide present, will make respondents more likely to agree with 
the planned military action. 
 The independent variable without genocide will cause respondents to use logic of 
consequence to get their answer because without genocide in the scenario respondents will view 
the military action as unnecessary. Genocide tends to cause a certain type of response that is 
urgent and demands immediate action to prevent further atrocities. However, if this element is 
absent in the scenario, fewer respondents will care because they will not see the military action 
as in U.S interests. If there is no humanitarian need to step in, then fewer respondents will be 
willing to use military resources because they view military action as to costly. Support for this 
hypothesis does not confirm or falsify the nuclear taboo, because it does not measure whether the 
use of nuclear weapons is affecting the respondents decision-making process. 
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Hypothesis 6: Scenarios without genocide present, will make respondents more likely to 
disagree with the planned military action.  
Respondents were given a third option that they could select for their answer and that was 
need more information. The reason respondents were given this option was to allow the 
respondent to not have to commit to a yes or no answer. Also, this allowed for respondents to be 
broken up into more than just two groups, providing a wider range of responses that could 
include both logics. As well this answer was used to assess whether respondents would want to 
look for more information or if they had enough to decide. Additionally, the need more 
information option provided another test group to look at to examine which effects were the 
strongest for each group of respondents.  
The independent variable high casualty rate will cause respondents to conduct cost 
benefit analysis because the respondents will want to minimize the amount of lives lost in the 
planned military operation. Respondents will be less likely to select need more information if 
casualty rates are high because the outcome is too costly. Additionally, respondents could also 
see high casualty rates as potentially risky, considering the operation may kill a lot of innocent 
people. Also, if the operation results in high casualty rates respondents would view the military 
action as unnecessary, seeking an alternative military operation with fewer casualties. Support 
for this hypothesis would prove the nuclear taboo is supported because the respondents are more 
likely to give a definitive answer if high casualties are going to result from the military proposal. 
Hypothesis 7: Scenarios with high casualties, will make respondents less likely to select need 
more information for the planned military action.  
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The independent variable nuclear airstrikes will cause respondents to use logic of 
appropriateness to select their answer because, nuclear weapons are an unusable weapon. 
Additionally, using nuclear weapons would increase the risk of damaging the U. S’s reputation 
and would violate a lot of American values. This would cause more respondents to not select 
need more information because the stakes are so high that they would rather say yes or no to the 
planned military operation. Support for this hypothesis would confirm that the nuclear taboo is 
supported because respondents are more likely to give a definitive answer if nuclear weapons are 
being used in the military proposal. 
Hypothesis 8: Scenarios with nuclear airstrikes, will make respondents less likely to select need 
more information for the planned military action. 
The independent variable genocide will cause respondents to use logic of appropriateness 
to reach their answer because genocide is seen as repulsive action that is condemned by the 
international community. Genocide is seen as an international violation and is seen by all states 
as an immoral practice. Using genocide would cause respondents to not select need more 
information because they see the need to prevent genocide from occurring. Respondents would 
see the result of doing nothing as immoral, and too risky to ignore. Support for this hypothesis 
would falsify the nuclear taboo because the respondents are more likely to give a definitive 
answer if genocide is occurring and would be willing to support the military proposal to prevent 
it further by any means necessary.  
Hypothesis 9: Scenarios with genocide, will make respondents less likely to select need more 
information for the planned military action.  
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METHODOLOGY 
There are several important defects in Press, Sagan, and Valentino’s experimental study 
of attitudes about nuclear weapons. The first problem is the prospective target in the experiment 
is Al Qaeda. Most American’s view Al Qaeda as evil; this bias makes it acceptable to use nuclear 
weapons against America’s greatest threat. Al Qaeda is not just an enemy of the United States; 
this group carried out the largest terrorist attack in American history on U.S soil. This event 
would limit the perception of the taboo due to the magnitude of the event and would have a 
priming effect on the respondents. According to Schacter, Stevens, and Wig (2008), “Priming is 
typically defined as a nonconscious or implicit form of memory” (624). Many would think a 
justifiable response would be for the United States to use nuclear weapons against Al Qaeda to 
prevent another major attack from happening again. Press, Sagan, and Valentino admit 
respondents could have selected to use nuclear weapons because the target was planning to kill 
many American civilians and went with the more effective option. To them, it was the most 
moral alternative. (2013, 201).  
Additionally, Press, Sagan, and Valentino describes policy choices that are determined by 
strategic interactions as results of logic of consequence, because states choose to avoid certain 
tactics that could set a precedent and harm their mutual long-term benefit. (2013, 189). However, 
by assuming that respondents who selected the option of setting a precedent for explaining why 
they did not favor using nuclear weapons, did so because of negative long-term costs. This 
assumption ignores the possibility that a respondent could have chosen not to use nuclear 
weapons because they did not want to break or change the rules about nuclear weapons use. 
Causing the respondents to choose to set precedent as their response to why they did not approve 
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of using nuclear weapons. In this case, the respondents would be using logic of appropriateness 
not logic of consequence in answering the question about why they did not support using nuclear 
weapons.  
Furthermore, Press, Sagan, and Valentino, define logic of appropriateness as 
preconceived ideas about types of behavior in terms of ethical and social prohibitions. (2013, 
189). In their experiment logic of appropriateness is closely associated with moral and ethical 
responses. However, Schultz (2014) states that “logic of appropriateness does not primarily refer 
to moral or aesthetical appropriateness; rather, the key feature of logic of appropriateness is a 
matching of rules to situations.” (3). This explains why most of the respondent who chose not to 
use nuclear weapons selected setting a precedent as their reason because using nuclear weapons 
would have gone against the rules of the situation. Focusing too closely on moral and ethical 
concerns, Press, Sagan, and Valentino, misinterpret what actions apply to logic of 
appropriateness.  
Also, Press, Sagan Valentino stated that, the decision to use nuclear weapons could set a 
precedent causing other states to build or use them (2013, 191). This variable is labeled as “set 
precedent”, on their list of reasons for preferring a conventional strike. Since Al Qaeda is not a 
recognized member of the international community, states would not view the use of nuclear 
weapons as a violation of norms. Norms can only be broken if it they are considered to be a part 
of a group’s identity. Another reason why the nuclear taboo would be void, because Al Qaeda is 
not seen as civilized group, this perception would allow for the United States to be seen justified 
in using nuclear weapons without changing the precedent of non-use. Tannenwald stated that the 
non-use of nuclear weapons is an agreement among the civilized societies, considered to be state 
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actors (1999, 437). Al Qaeda does not fit into this group; therefore, using nuclear weapons 
against a non-state actor would not have the same effect as using nuclear weapons against 
another civilized state actor.  
Another defect in the experiment is that all the information is provided to the participants 
inadvertently priming respondents to conduct cost benefit analysis, rather than them choosing the 
logic of consequence approach. Domke, Shah, and Wackman (1998) stated, “Priming effects-the 
process by which activated mental constructs can influence how individuals evaluate other 
concepts and ideas” (51). Information that participants are given include mission success rates, 
estimated casualty rates, and description of hypothetical terrorist attack if the mission fails. 
Providing all this information reduces the presence of logic of the appropriateness in the 
experiment, priming the respondents so that they will give a certain answer to a question. 
 According to Schacter and Tulving (1990), “priming is a type of implicit memory; it 
does not involve explicit or conscious recollection of any previous experiences.” (pg. 301). By 
using certain words in their scenario such as casualty rates, success, and terrorist to describe 
what is going, respondents are giving answers that are based in logic of consequence. Dehaene et 
al. (1998) argued, priming causes cognition process to start without having access to 
consciousness (597). The respondents are not doing this knowingly and are not consciously 
coming to their own conclusion in Press, Sagan, and Valentino’s research experiment. 
Lastly, for respondents who choose to use nuclear weapons in their scenario, there is no 
way to measure if this response is a result of logic of appropriateness. Press, Sagan, and 
Valentino assume that if the respondents are choosing nuclear weapons, they are cost benefit 
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analyzing, even though respondents could be making this decision under the influence of another 
norm. If a respondent chooses to use nuclear weapons because Al Qaeda is a terrorist group and 
terrorism is seen by civilized societies as morally wrong, then the response to use nuclear 
weapons is based off the logic of appropriateness argument because terrorism is seen by civilized 
society as prohibited behavior. If the public does perceive terrorists’ organizations as a danger to 
society, then nuclear weapons would become acceptable to use to defeat terrorism. The United 
States has declared war on terrorism in the past. This declaration in the eyes of the American 
public must be won. The negative feelings of Americans toward terrorists’ organizations would 
come from the social norms established by the international community, and the decision to use 
nuclear weapons would stem from logic of appropriateness.  
These defects can be overcome using an alternate experimental design. In this alternate 
scenario, participants will be presented with a military conflict and will have to decide whether 
they approve, disapprove, need more information, or neither approve nor disapprove of a 
potential United States military action. The three experimentally manipulated independent 
variables are, the type of airstrike that is carried out, the casualties caused by the airstrike, and a 
social norm. The scenario has eight different versions, to account for the three variables in the 
experiment.  Each version will have a military action conducted by the United States, either a 
conventional airstrike or a nuclear airstrike. Each version will have casualties ranging either from 
5,000 to 50,000. Additionally, the state the United States has launched a military strike against a 
state that have conducted genocide or have not. This gives us all the possible versions of the 
scenario in the experiment, to determine if there is in any difference in respondent’s answers to 
the different versions. See scenarios below. 
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Version 1 
Imagine that a state has attacked an American ally. The purpose of the attack is to overthrow the ally’s government. 
To stop the attack before the allied government is overthrown, the United States government is going to launch a 
[conventional airstrike] against the attacking state’s military forces. The conventional airstrike is [estimated to kill 
50,000 people.] 
Version 2 
Imagine that a state has attacked an American ally. The purpose of the attack is to overthrow the ally’s government. 
To stop the attack before the allied government is overthrown, the United States government is going to launch a 
[nuclear airstrike] against the attacking state’s military forces. The nuclear strike is [estimated to kill 5,000 people.] 
Version 3 
 Imagine that a state has attacked an American ally. The purpose of the attack is to overthrow the ally’s government. 
The attacking state has also [engaged in genocidal attacks] against civilians in the allied state. To stop the attack 
before the allied government is overthrown [and to stop the attacking state from continuing genocide,] the United 
States is going to launch a [conventional airstrike] against the attacking state’s military forces. The conventional 
airstrike is [estimated to kill 50,000 people.] 
Version 4 
Imagine that a state has attacked an American ally. The purpose of the attack is to overthrow the ally’s government. 
The attacking state has also [engaged in genocidal attacks] against civilians in the allied state. To stop the attack 
before the allied government is overthrown [and to stop the attacking state from continuing genocide,] the United 
States is going to launch a [nuclear strike] against the state’s military forces. The nuclear strike is [estimated to kill 
5,000 people.] 
Version 5 
Imagine that a state has attacked an American ally. The purpose of the attack is to overthrow the ally’s government. 
To stop the attack before the allied government is overthrown, the United States government is going to launch a 
[nuclear airstrike] against the attacking state’s military forces. The nuclear strike is [estimated to kill 50,000 people.] 
Version 6 
Imagine that a state has attacked an American ally. The purpose of the attack is to overthrow the ally’s government. 
To stop the attack before the allied government is overthrown, the United States government is going to launch a 
[conventional airstrike] against the attacking state’s military forces. The conventional airstrike is [estimated to kill 
5,000 people.] 
Version 7 
Imagine that a state has attacked an American ally. The purpose of the attack is to overthrow the ally’s government. 
The attacking state has also [engaged in genocidal attacks] against civilians in the allied state. To stop the attack 
before the allied government is overthrown [and to stop the attacking state from continuing genocide,] the United 
States government is going to launch a [conventional airstrike] against the attacking state’s military forces. The 
conventional airstrike is [estimated to kill 5,000 people.] 
Version 8 
Imagine that a state has attacked an American ally. The purpose of the attack is to overthrow the ally’s government. 
The attacking state has also [engaged in genocidal attacks] against civilians in the allied state. To stop the attack 
before the allied government is overthrown [and to stop the attacking state from continuing genocide,] the United 
States government is going to launch a [nuclear strike] against the state’s military forces. The nuclear strike is 
[estimated to kill 50,000 people.] 
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After participants have read the scenario they will be given two questions. The first 
question asks respondents, how much did the following considerations influence their answers?  
Reponses range from a great deal, a lot, a moderate amount, a little, not at all, and not relevant. 
By providing respondents with a range we can assess whether logic of consequence or logic of 
appropriateness is stronger or weaker in an individual’s decision. Then respondents will be 
presented with a second question and given a list of ten considerations and asked which 
considerations made them more supportive or less supportive of the planned military action? 
This will provide a clear idea of what specific information influenced respondents to be more or 
less supportive of the planned military action. Certain considerations will be coded as logic of 
consequence and others will be coded as taboo responses for both questions. In doing so we can 
accurately determine if people are influenced more by logic of consequence or the nuclear taboo.  
 After answering the scenario, respondents will give a list of questions and will be asked 
whether they strongly agree, agree, somewhat agree, neither disagree nor agree, somewhat 
disagree, disagree, and strongly disagree. Certain questions will be asked to measure different 
moral values such as harm and care, purity and sanctity, and in-group loyalty, helping identify 
which values are more closely associated with the nuclear taboo. Also, the survey asks 
respondents questions regarding patriotism and nationalism to measure how strong these 
attitudes about one’s identity affect the decision to break a norm. Showing just how strong the 
nuclear taboo is when compared to other important identity behaviors.  
This alternate design addresses the main problems in Press, Sagan, and Valentino’s 
experiment. The first major defect in Press, Sagan, and Valentino’s experimental design is their 
choice to use Al Qaeda as the prospective target. In the alternate experiment design, Al Qaeda is 
20 
 
no longer the main target of U.S military action, instead it is a state’s military forces. The reason 
the state is not given a specific name, is to remove the American public’s bias about the intended 
target of the U.S military. In the alternate design genocide is put in place of Al Qaeda, this 
establishes the state actor in the scenario as evil, without providing the state’s name and provides 
the actor with an identity that does not completely remove in-group bias. By not giving the 
perspective target a name, the experiment avoids acquiring responses that are based off historical 
events in the past. Forcing the respondents to not evaluate the situation based on who is involved, 
but rather the type of action that is being taken. By not providing the name of the specific target, 
we are limiting the amount of in-group bias in the experiment.  
The second problem in their experiment, is that one of the categories that respondents 
could choose from for preferring a conventional strike over a nuclear strike was, that it would set 
a precedent that would make nuclear weapons usable. The problem with this category is that Al 
Qaeda is not a state, other states would not view the use of nuclear weapons as a violation of 
norms, due to its lack of recognition in the international community. In the alternate experiment, 
making the perspective target a state. Allows for the respondents to correctly apply the category 
of “setting a precedent”. The international community would not view the use of nuclear 
weapons against Al Qaeda, as it would if the target was a state. Making the perspective target a 
state, gives this category a more accurate response, due to the target being a member of the 
international community. The nuclear taboo is seen as a rule about the use of nuclear weapons 
among civilized societies, if the target does not fit into that category, then the rules about nuclear 
weapons do not apply to it. Thus, setting a precedent would not count as a reason, why 
respondents would choose conventional strike, over nuclear strike.  
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Additionally, instead of asking respondents why they choose not to use nuclear weapons, 
the alternate experiment asks which considerations in the given scenario made them more 
supportive or less supportive of the U.S military plan. This gives the respondents multiple 
reasons for why they choose to support or not support U.S military action. Making it possible for 
respondents to conduct both logic of consequence and logic of appropriateness. Also, it limits the 
morality emphasis that Press, Sagan, and Valentino associated with the logic of appropriateness 
because we are not asking respondents why they choose their answer. Instead, we are asking 
respondents what information given influenced them the most in making their decision. 
Another defect in their experiment that was listed was that they provided all the 
information to the respondents, inadvertently priming respondents to conduct cost benefit 
analysis, rather than them choosing the logic of consequence approach. In the alternate 
experiment, all the information is not provided to the respondents, instead they must look for the 
information. By requiring respondents to conduct cost benefit analysis on their own, the 
experiment is giving the respondents the opportunity to choose how they come up with their 
answer to the scenario. By avoiding unnecessary information in the scenario, minimizes the 
possibility for priming to occur. Instead of telling respondents what the consequences will be, 
respondents will have to decide what the consequences could be. Thus, avoiding information that 
would trigger a specific response, rather than the responses being genuine and coming directly 
from their own thought process. 
 Lastly, the experiment, does not considered the presence of another social norm. Press, 
Sagan, and Valentino assume that if respondents choose to use nuclear weapons, then the 
respondents are using logic of consequence. By using a terrorist group such as Al Qaeda as the 
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target, the respondents could be basing their decision to use nuclear weapons because of 
terrorism is being an immoral act. In the alternate experiment, the issue is addressed by 
accounting for another social norm as a reason why nuclear weapons would be appropriate to 
use. According to Dolan, deciding to violate a taboo to preserve other values will seem tragic 
rather than taboo (2013, 38). The alternate experiment uses genocide as the other social norm 
present in the experiment because genocide is condemned broadly among the international 
community as an immoral act. This should provide us with the same type of reasoning that was 
not accounted for in Press, Sagan, and Valentino’s experiment, as to why its respondents would 
approve the use of nuclear weapons to defend other social norms that are more vital to the 
interest of civilized society than the nuclear taboo. 
 In this experiment the participants consisted of mostly college students, however, a small 
number of the respondents were quite older. The average age of the respondents was twenty-
eight years old of the 104 respondents who participated in the survey. The survey was created 
using Qualtrics and was disseminated through email to students providing them with information 
about the survey and the survey link to take it. The number of respondents who participated that 
were male was forty-nine and the number of respondents who were female that participated was 
fifty-five. When it came to income most respondents made $50,000 or less with a total of thirty-
seven respondents falling in this category, and twenty-nine respondents made more than 
$50,000, but less than $100,000. With twenty-four respondents making more than $100,000 a 
year. Here are the results from the survey data collected.  
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RESULTS 
Table 1: Respondents Who Selected Agreed or Disagreed 
Indep. Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Agree Agree Disagree Disagree 
Nuclear -1.168** 
(.435) 
-2.666*** 
(.735) 
2.271*** 
(.534) 
3.662*** 
(.946) 
High Casualty -.481 
(.429) 
-.979† 
(.586) 
1.088* 
(.501) 
1.983* 
(.819) 
Genocide 1.141** 
(.434) 
.937† 
(.560) 
-.939† 
(.499) 
-.422 
(.636) 
SizeHousehold  .459 
(.305) 
 -.784* 
(.359) 
Income  .059 
(.188) 
 .226 
(.229) 
Ideology  .951** 
(.276) 
 -1.208*** 
(.346) 
Him  -.131 
(.552) 
 .353 
(.639) 
Age  -.014 
(.020) 
 -.019 
(.029) 
NukesLSupt  .649 
(.566) 
 -.518 
(.668) 
Constant  -2.830 
(1.279) 
 1.565 
(1.417) 
# of resp. 1 45  34  
# of resp. 2  88  88 
 
 
 
Casualties: Low or High 
 Analyzing the findings using logistic regression for binary dependent variables, I have 
found the results for Hypothesis 1 to be mixed. The number of respondents who agreed to the 
military operation was 45, and the number of respondents who selected disagree was 34.  The 
Key: †= p < .1, * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001, P= (sig) 
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first hypothesis expects that high casualties will increase disagreement with the proposed 
military action and decrease agreement with the proposed military action. While the high 
casualties co-efficient for agree was negative (-.481) and in the expected direction, it did not 
meet thresholds of statistical significance (p= .263). In contrast, the high casualty co-efficient for 
disagree is in the expected direction (1.088), and it is significant at the p= .05 level (p = .03). 
Hypothesis 7 expects that high casualties will decrease the need for more information with the 
proposed military action. The number of respondents that selected need more information was 
25. The evidence for hypothesis 7 is mixed. While the high casualty co-efficient for need more 
information was negative (-.453) going in the expected direction, it did not meet thresholds for 
statistical significance (p= .343).  
 Analyzing the findings using the logistic regression for binary dependent variable, I have 
found that Hypothesis 2 is mixed. The second hypothesis expects that low casualty rates will 
increase agreement with the proposed military action and decrease disagreement with the 
proposed military action. While the effect of high casualty co-efficient for agree was negative (-
.481), this shows that for low casualties the result is in the expected direction and is not 
statistically significant (p= .263). This shows that the effect of low casualties is also not 
statistically significant and has minimal effect on the respondent’s decision-making process. The 
co-efficient value being close to zero, tells that similar effects would result if lower casualties 
were present in the scenario. Additionally, the high casualty co-efficient for disagree is in the 
expected direction (1.088), and it is statistically significant at the p= .05 level (p = .03). This 
shows that low casualties would have a stronger effect on the respondents who disagreed to do 
the distance the co-efficient is from the score of zero. 
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Airstrike: Nuclear or Conventional 
   Analyzing the findings using the logistic regression for binary dependent variables, I 
have found the results for Hypothesis 3 to be correct. The third hypothesis expects that 
conventional airstrikes will increase agreement with the proposed military action and decrease 
disagreement with the proposed military action. While the nuclear co-efficient for agree was 
negative (-1.168) in the expected direction, this shows that conventional airstrike would have the 
opposite effect making the respondents more likely to agree with the proposed military action. 
The nuclear co-efficient for disagree was positive (2.271) and in the expected direction. This co-
efficient value far enough away from zero that the use of conventional airstrikes would have the 
opposite effect on respondents.  
    Analyzing the findings using the logistic regression for binary dependent variable, I 
have found the results for Hypothesis 4 to be correct. The fourth hypothesis expects that nuclear 
airstrike will increase disagreement with the military proposal and decrease agreement with the 
military proposal. With the nuclear co-efficient for agree being negative (-1.168) in the expected 
direction, it also meet the thresholds for statistical significance (p= .007). Additionally, the 
nuclear co-efficient for disagree is (2.271) in the expected direction and it is statistically 
significant at the p= .05 level (p= .000). However, nuclear has a stronger impact on the 
respondents who disagree, compared to respondents who agreed with the planned military action. 
Hypothesis 8 expects that nuclear airstrike will decrease need for more information with the 
proposed military action. The results for this hypothesis are mixed. While the nuclear co-
efficient for need more information was negative (-.901) going in the expected direction, it did 
not meet thresholds for statistical significance (p= .066).  
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Genocide or Not 
Analyzing the findings using the logistic regression for binary dependent variable, I have 
found the results for Hypothesis 5 to be mixed. The fifth hypothesis expects that genocide will 
decrease disagreement with the proposal and increase agreement with the proposal. With the 
genocide coefficient for agree being positive (1.141) in the expected direction and is also 
statistically significant at the p=.05 level (p=.008). In contrast, the genocide co-efficient for 
disagree is negative (-.939) and is in the expected direction, however, it did not meet the 
thresholds for statistical significance (p= .060). The ninth hypothesis expects that genocide will 
decrease need more information with the proposed military action. The evidence for this 
hypothesis is mixed. While the co-efficient for need more information was negative (-.556) in the 
expected direction it did not meet the thresholds for statistical significance (p= .244). The 
strongest effect for this hypothesis is the category of respondents who selected agree with the 
military proposal.  
Analyzing the findings using the logistic regression for binary dependent variable, I have 
found the results for Hypothesis 6 to be mixed. The sixth hypothesis expects that when genocide 
is not in the scenario it will decrease agreement with the military proposal and will increase 
disagreement with the military proposal. With the genocide co-efficient for agree being positive 
(1.141), in the expected direction, when genocide is absent the effect will be negative for those 
who agree with the proposal. With the genocide co-efficient for disagree being negative (-.939) 
and in the expected direction, when genocide is absent it will increase disagreement for the 
proposed military operation. The charts below represent the number of times each variable was 
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present in the scenario for respondents who selected agree, disagree, and need more information 
as there answer.  
Figure 1: Respondents Who Selected Agree with Variables Present 
 
Figure 2: Respondents Who Selected Disagree with Variables Present 
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Figure 3: Respondents Who Selected Need More Information with Variables Present 
 
Control Variables 
Additionally, the results include a few other independent variable effects such as age, 
gender, income, and political ideology. Analyzing the results shows that there is only one 
statistically significant variable the influences the respondents and this is political ideology. 
Looking at the variables in the equation table for respondents who agreed with the planned 
military action, shows that the relationship is positive. Conservatives were more likely to agree 
with the proposed military action. The co-efficient value for political ideology is .951 and shows 
that there is a political ideology effect on the respondent’s decision to the planned military 
action. The p-value for political ideology is (.001), which is statistically significant. These 
findings show that when respondents agreed to the planned military action, there is a political 
ideological influence when making their decision.  
 The results for respondents who selected disagree, when it came to political ideology had 
a negative effect. Conservatives were less likely to disagree with the proposed military action. 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Nuclear
High Casualty
Genocide
Need More Information
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Analyzing the coefficient value for political ideology (which is -1.208), indicates that when 
respondents select to disagree, their political ideology has a major effect on the outcome. The p-
value for political ideology is (.000), which is statistically significant. These findings show that 
when respondents disagreed with the planned military action, there was political ideological 
difference that influenced the respondents. Looking at the respondents who disagreed with the 
planned military action, there responses are more effected by political ideology than the 
respondents who agreed to the planned military action. Showing that when respondents came to 
disagree with the planned military action, their political ideology had a stronger influence over 
their decision as compared to the respondents who agreed to the planned military action. This 
effect can be seen by comparing the two p-values of each respondent group. Furthermore, the b 
value shows that the negative effect for respondents who disagreed with the planned military 
action, is larger than the respondents who agreed to the planned military action. 
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DISCUSSION 
For respondents who selected agree as their answer to the planned military action, 
showed that the nuclear variable had the strongest effect and the most statistically significant 
effect. With a coefficient value of (-1.168) and a p-value of (.007) nuclear had the strongest 
effect on the respondents who chose to agree with the proposal. This indicates that nuclear 
weapons made respondents more likely to disagree with the military proposal, than any of the 
other two variables. The second strongest variable for respondents who selected agree as their 
answer was genocide, with a coefficient value of (1.141) and a p value of (.008). These results 
show that when genocide is present in the scenario it increases the respondent’s tendencies to 
agree with the planned military action, however, it is not as strong as the nuclear variable. The 
weakest variable for respondents who agreed to the planned military action was high casualties, 
the coefficient value of (-.481) and a p-value of (.263). These findings reveal that for respondents 
who agreed with the planned military action were influenced mostly by the nuclear variable and 
prove that the nuclear taboo had the strongest effect on respondents. 
 Looking at respondents who selected disagree as their answer to the planned military 
action. Indicated that the nuclear variable had the strongest and was the most statistically 
significant effect on the respondents. With a coefficient value of (2.271) and a p-value of (.000), 
nuclear had the strongest effect on the respondents who chose to disagree as their answer. The 
nuclear variable has the strongest effect on respondents who select disagree with the military 
proposal than any other variable. This proves the hypotheses and supports the effect of a nuclear 
taboo for respondents who selected disagree. 
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The second strongest variable for respondents who selected disagree as their answer was 
high casualties, with a coefficient value of (1.088) and a p-value of (.030). This shows that 
respondents are also not likely to support military action if the scenario has high casualty 
outcomes and proves that the nuclear taboo is not the only reason respondents are disagreeing 
with the planned military action. The weakest variable for respondents who disagreed with the 
planned military action was genocide, with a coefficient value of (-.939) and p-value of (.060). 
These results show that respondents who disagreed with the planned military action were more 
likely to do so because of the presence of nuclear weapons, followed by high casualties, and then 
genocide. These findings are consistent with the hypotheses and show that the nuclear taboo has 
the strongest effect when it comes to why respondents disagreed with the proposed military 
action.  
 Examining the respondents who selected need more information as their answer to the 
planned military action, conveyed that the nuclear variable had the strongest effect on the 
respondents. With a coefficient value of (-.901) and a p-value of (.066), nuclear had the strongest 
effect on respondents who selected need more information. This conveys that when nuclear 
weapons are present it increases the possibility that respondents will select disagree or agree with 
the proposed military action. The presence of nuclear weapons puts more skin in the game and 
increases the risk that respondents would have to be willing to consider, when selecting need 
more information.  
The second strongest variable for this respondent group was genocide, with a coefficient 
value of (-.556) and a p-value of (.244). The variable with the weakest effect was high casualties, 
with a coefficient value of (-.453) and p value of (.343). Although, respondents are less willing to 
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select need more information when genocide or high casualties are present the strength of that 
relationship is relatively weaker than the nuclear variable. Respondents don’t associate the same 
amount or risk for genocide and high casualties that they do for nuclear weapons. These results 
support the presence of a nuclear taboo for respondents who select need more information, 
however, the effect is weaker for this respondent group than the other two groups. 
 This thesis used a more appropriate experimental framework to test whether the nuclear 
taboo shapes the perception of nuclear weapons among the public. Challenging Press, Sagan, and 
Valentino’s (2013) research that people are more likely to use logic of consequence rather than 
logic of appropriateness when assessing the use of nuclear weapons. There is evidence in this 
experiment that proves that logic of consequence is present when respondents are considering the 
use of nuclear weapons. The results for respondents who selected disagree for the proposed 
military action, show that high casualty rates had a significant effect on the respondent’s 
decision. However, the findings of this research indicate that the logic of appropriateness has a 
stronger influence on respondent’s decision compared to logic of consequence.  
Most of the findings indicate that nuclear weapons seem to be the deciding factor for 
many of the respondents in the survey. The nuclear variable has some statistically significant 
effect for most of the respondent groups. While high casualty has some effect on the 
respondents, higher casualties have lower statistically significance and smaller coefficient values 
compared to the nuclear variable. Additionally, the third effect of genocide is present and 
respondents who do agree with the planned military action do so because of the presence of 
genocide. However, genocide has the lowest p-value of the three independent variables 
introduced in the research. It also has the smaller coefficient values than the other two variables 
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in the research and shows that genocide has minimal effect on the respondents. Overall, the 
variable with the strongest effect in the experiment is nuclear followed by high casualties, and 
then genocide. This research helps show that when respondents are deciding to agree or disagree 
with the planned military action when nuclear weapons are being used, respondents will disagree 
with the planned military action, revealing the presence of a nuclear taboo.  
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CONCLUSION 
 There have been many theories that have tried to explain the practice of non-use when it 
comes to nuclear weapons, such as the nuclear taboo. The purpose of this thesis is to determine if 
social norms shape public attitudes regarding the use of nuclear weapons based on Nuclear 
Taboo Theory. By assessing if the public uses logic of appropriateness to make their decision 
about the use of nuclear weapons, or if they use logic of consequence when making their 
decision. This thesis has found that logic of appropriateness is responsible for the decision 
making of many of the respondents. These findings indicate that the variable with the most 
statistically significant effect of the three independent variables introduced was the type of 
airstrike used.  
  The other two variables in the research high casualties and genocide had relatively minor 
effects on the respondent’s decision to agree or disagree with the planned military action. When 
looking at genocide, the effect is minimal on the respondent’s decision-making process, while 
high casualties has a stronger effect on the respondent’s answer. These research findings 
conclude that the nuclear taboo is present and that in the public’s view, the use of nuclear 
weapons is unconventional and that they are unlike other weapons. That when it comes to 
nuclear weapons, the public does not support their use even if using them could beneficial. These 
findings help establish that a nuclear taboo is present and that the type of weapons being used 
has a greater effect than high casualties and the use of genocide.  
 This project has several limitations. One limitation is that the sample of respondents is 
relatively small for the number of variables present in the experiment. With only 104 total 
35 
 
responses for eight different outcomes, there is a limited amount of data present for each 
scenario. Second, most of the respondents are college students, and around the same age. This 
may have caused the experiment to only capture what one generation thinks about nuclear 
weapons, rather than the overall public. The third limitation of the experiment is that most of the 
respondents were U.S citizens and does not provide a representation of what other country 
citizens may think about the use of nuclear weapons. Lastly, although respondents are affected 
more by the presence of nuclear weapons, this does not mean that the nuclear taboo is the only 
reason for why they choose not to support the planned military action. Their maybe other factors 
about nuclear weapons that could be affecting the results of respondents about nuclear weapons.  
 To develop this research further, one could increase the number of independent variables 
present in the experiment. Considering that two of the three variables in the scenario are taboo 
related and only one is a logic of consequence, there might be other cost benefit variables that 
have a stronger impact on respondents, such as operational expenses or cost of damages. This 
could weaken the effect of nuclear or genocide variables on the respondents showing that cost 
benefit analysis is more effective in the decision-making process. Additionally, more research is 
needed to understand what unconscious psychological elements are in affect when respondents 
are making their decision. A possible experiment that could test this would be using priming to 
assess whether respondents have strong responses to certain words, such as nuclear or genocide 
compared to other words like casualties. This would help measure which variables that trigger 
the unconscious response of respondents more and would provide evidence of which type of 
variable is stronger. Overall, the results of this experiment indicate that nuclear weapons have 
more influence over respondents, when they go about assessing the scenario. 
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